Key Findings
- 214 takedown requests targeting 212 VPN apps were issued by Roskomnadzor between March 12 and April 1, 2025.
- 53 VPN apps unavailable in Russia were identified, but only 6 apps (3%) out of the 212 targeted were found unavailable in Russia’s Google Play Store.
- Google appears to have largely resisted the censorship demands, unlike Apple in 2024.
- 47 VPN apps unavailable in Russia were not mentioned in Roskomnadzor’s recent requests—over half of them were already unavailable since 2023 or early 2024.
- 6 VPN apps previously targeted by Roskomnadzor have disappeared from all Play Stores worldwide, with no verifiable date of removal.
- Evidence suggests that Roskomnadzor may be issuing requests without verifying the actual availability of the apps.
Introduction
On March 21, 2025, the Russian business news outlet Rusbase (Русбейс, RB.ru) published a report exposing a wave of censorship requests issued by Roskomnadzor, Russia’s federal agency in charge of regulating mass media and online information. Through the Lumen Database—a platform maintained by the Berkman Klein Center for Internet & Society—investigative journalist Maria Kolomychenko uncovered 47 individual requests submitted to Google between March 12 and March 21, each demanding the removal of a specific VPN application from
Russia’s Google Play Store. Nineteen distinct VPN apps were named, most of which were targeted for enabling access to restricted online content and communication channels. Several of these requests cited Russia’s “Federal Law No. 149-FZ of July 27, 2006, On Information, Information Technologies, and Information Protection.”
This is not Roskomnadzor’s first coordinated effort to suppress VPN access. In mid-2024, the agency sent similar demands to Apple, requesting the removal of VPN apps from the Russian App Store. GreatFire’s App Censorship Project later discovered that Apple had removed around 60 VPN apps over three months, more than double the number publicly reported.
This research investigates whether Google followed a similar path in response to the most recent wave of requests. It assesses the current availability of VPN apps in Russia’s Play Store, the timing of app removals (if any), and broader implications for online access and digital rights.
Methodology
Objectives
Our primary objective was to determine whether Google complied with Roskomnadzor’s takedown requests by removing targeted VPN apps from Russia’s Play Store. Using the GoogleCensorship.org Play Store Monitor (PSM), we tested the availability of VPN apps
specifically mentioned in Roskomnadzor’s Lumen Database requests. Additionally, we expanded our scope to test a comprehensive range of VPN-related apps to establish a broader understanding of their current availability in Russia. Where feasible, we aimed to identify approximate dates of removal.
Process
The study involved three main phases:
- Compilation of VPN Apps:
A database of 399 VPN-related apps was created based on a broad definition of VPN tools. These included:
- Full-Service VPN Apps: Standalone apps offering subscriptions and integrated servers (e.g., ExpressVPN, NordVPN).
- VPN Client Apps: Apps requiring user-supplied credentials or third-party servers (e.g., OpenVPN Connect, WireGuard).
- Hybrid Security Apps: Multi-functional apps with VPN features, such as secure browsers (e.g., Brave, Aloha).
- Proxy/VPN-like Tools: Apps using alternative tunneling protocols (e.g., Shadowsocks, V2Ray).
- Data Collection and Testing:
Between March 23 and April 3, 2025, the Play Store Monitor (PSM) was used to test the availability of all 399 apps in various Play Stores, including Russia. Approximately 40% of these apps had previously been monitored by PSM since its launch in late 2023. Some apps were tested for the first time during this period, enabling a snapshot view of their current availability.
- Analysis of App Availability and Removals:
Each app’s status was analyzed using the PSM database and, in some cases, external sources. The analysis focused on:
- Removal Dates: Estimated by identifying the last known date the app was available and the first date it was found unavailable.
- Availability Classification: Apps were sorted into categories: currently available, currently unavailable with no clear removal date, or removed during a specific timeframe. If an app was found to be consistently unavailable since testing began, it was marked as “since at least [date]” based on the earliest PSM test.
Result
Overview of VPN Availability
Out of 399 VPN-related apps tested, 346 (87%) were available in Russia’s Play Store, and 53 (13%) were not. An additional 6 apps named in Roskomnadzor’s takedown requests had disappeared entirely from all Play Stores, rendering them untestable via the PSM.
Popular apps like OpenVPN client app, Proton VPN, Mullvad VPN, Lantern, WireGuard, and Orbot by Tor remain accessible. Several widely used VPNs, including Turbo VPN and Proton VPN, still register millions of downloads in Russia, according to AppMagic.com.
| Apps with Over 2M Downloads Still Available in Russia | ||||
| # | App Name | App ID | Developer | Status |
| 1 | VPN – Super Unlimited Proxy | com.free.vpn.super.hotspo t.open | VPN Super Inc | ✓ |
| 2 | VPN Proxy Speed – Super VPN | com.supervpn.vpn.free.pro xy | TOPAPPS TECH PTE LTD | ✓ |
| 3 | Turbo VPN – Secure VPN Proxy | free.vpn.unblock.proxy.tur bovpn | Innovative Connecting | ✓ |
| 4 | 1.1.1.1 + WARP: SaferInternet | com.cloudflare.onedotone dotonedotone | Cloudflare, Inc. | ✓ |
| 5 | VPN Proton: Fast & Secure VPN | ch.protonvpn.android | Proton AG | ✓ |
| 6 | Free VPN Super™ -Fast & Secure | con.hotspot.vpn.free.maste r | TOPAPPS TECH PTE LTD | ✓ |
| 7 | VPN – fast proxy + secure | free.vpn.proxy.secure | Stolitomson VPN | ✓ |
| 8 | Speedy Quark VPN – VPN Master | com.speedy.vpn | VPN – Fast Master Proxy Inc. | ✓ |
| 9 | VPN Proxy Master – Safer Vpn | free.vpn.unblock.proxy.vp n.master.pro | LEMON CLOVE PTE. LIMITED | ✓ |
| 10 | VPN Proxy Speed – Super VPN | com.supervpn.vpn.free.pro xy | TOPAPPS TECH PTE LTD | ✓ |
Unavailable Apps
Despite overall availability, 13% of VPN apps tested were unavailable in Russia. Prominent VPN providers like Astrill VPN, ExpressVPN, NordVPN, have been removed, while Psiphon is only partially available—its free version is unavailable, but its Pro version remains accessible.
Unavailable VPN apps were grouped according to estimated removal dates:
- Confirmed Unavailable Since Late 2023 (5 apps): These apps were confirmed unavailable during initial testing in December 2023, indicating previous removals.
- Confirmed Unavailable Since Early 2024 (17 apps): Data suggests these apps were likely unavailable since at least March or September 2024.
- Removal Confirmed in Mid-2024 (5 apps): Apps removed between April and September 2024 coincide with the timing of Apple censorship requests.
- Confirmed Unavailable Since March 2025 (24 apps): Recently tested apps without historical data, reflecting current status only.
- Removal Confirmed in Early 2025 (2 apps): Removed during the early months of 2025, indicating recent removals.
Of the 212 VPN apps specifically targeted by Roskomnadzor, only 6 (3%) were unavailable in Russia:
| # | VPN NAME | ID | Targeted on | Removal dates |
1 | ExpressVPN: Fast & Secure VPN | com.expressvpn.vpn | March 13, 2025 | Between 2024-06-10 16:00& 2024-08-3017:48 |
| 2 | My Private VPN | com.ion.freevpn | March 13, 2025 | Since at least 2025-04-04 00:58 |
| 3 | Secure VPN－SaferInternet | com.fast.free.unblock.secu re.vpn | March 13, 2025 | Since at least : 2023-12-08 23:34 |
| 4 | South Africa VPN | com.banglatech.southafrica vpn | March 12, 2025 | Since at least 2025-04-04 13:16 |
| 5 | T VPN: Unlimited Proxy Master | com.safebrand.tv | March 13, 2025 | Since at least 2025-04-04 01:01 |
| 6 | Thunder VPN – Fast, Safe VPN | com.fast.free.unblock.thun der.vpn | March 21, 2025 | Since at least 2023-12-08 23:34 |
Notably, Thunder VPN, Secure VPN, and ExpressVPN became unavailable before Roskomnadzor issued requests. The time of removal of the three other apps remains uncertain due to limited historical data.
Five apps were removed between April and September 2024, coinciding with the timing of Apple censorship requests :
| # | VPN NAME | ID | Removal from Google’s Ru Play Store | Removal from Apple’s Ru App Store |
1 | CyberGhost VPN: Secure VPN | de.mobileconcepts.cyberghost | Between 2024-06-2623:37& 2024-09-03 21:33 | Between 2024-07-0521:49and 2024-07-07 17:33 |
| 2 | ExpressVPN: Fast & Secure VPN | com.expressvpn.v pn | Between 2024-06-1016:00& 2024-08-30 17:48 | Between 2024-07-0521:49and 2024-07-06 03:59 |
| 3 | Private Internet Access VPN | com.privateintern etaccess.android | Between 2024-05-0316:45& 2024-09-03 13:39 | Since at least 2021-06- 25 17:17 |
| 4 | VeePN – Secure VPN & Antivirus | com.vpnproxy.con nect | Between 2024-04-2208:14& 2024-07-01 15:38 | Since at least 2022-07- 21 15:11 |
| 5 | X-VPN – Private Browser VPN | com.security.xvpn.z35kb | Between 2024-06-1016:00& 2024-09-03 21:32 | Between 2024-08-2614:27and 2024-08-29 20:13 |
An additional six VPN apps targeted by Roskomnadzor have disappeared entirely from all Play Stores worldwide, with unclear timing and no confirmed reason for their removal.
| # | VPN NAME | ID (found in Roskomnadzor’s requests) | Targeted on | Status / dates |
1 | ?? | com.megavpn.freevpn | March 21, 2025 | Disappeared / ? |
| 2 | KING LINK PROXY | app.kinglinkproxy.build | March 13, 2025 | Disappeared / ? |
| 3 | Royal VPN – Fast Proxy VPN | com.royalvpn.proxy | March 13, 2025 | Disappeared / ? |
| 4 | VPN (Proxy) Master | com.freevpn.unblock.pr oxy | March 20, 2025 | Disappeared / ? |
| 5 | VPN Hungary – Use Hungary IP | vpn.freevpn.red.hungar yvpn.proxy | March 25, 2025 | Disappeared / ? |
| 6 | VPN Master: Fast VPN Proxy | com.dot.fast.vpn.master.secure.proxy | March 26, 2025 | Disappeared / ? |
47 unavailable VPN apps were not explicitly targeted by recent requests. Half of them (24 apps) have been unavailable since early 2024 or earlier.
Analysis and comments
The study reveals a complex picture: while some VPN apps are indeed unavailable in Russia’s Play Store, the vast majority remain accessible despite Roskomnadzor’s recent pressure campaign. Unlike Apple’s swift compliance in 2024, Google appears to have resisted these takedown requests—either intentionally or due to delayed action pending legal review.
Of the 24 VPN apps that have been unavailable since at least March 2025, some may have been removed recently and/or around the same time, potentially indicating Google’s involvement. In addition, five of the unavailable apps were found to have been removed around summer 2024. This suggests that Google may have complied with some of Roskomnadzor’s takedown requests at that time. Our September 2024 research confirmed that these same apps had also been removed by Apple, following a wave of takedown demands whose true scale remains unclear— but which we documented as being at least twice as large as what was publicly acknowledged by Russian news agency Interfax. For three of these VPNs, we detected the removal of their iOS versions in July and August 2024, at the height of the App Store crackdown. If Google was found to have complied with censorship requests then, it would not be surprising to discover similar compliance this time around.
However, other available data points to a different explanation:
A total of 27 VPN apps—more than half of those currently unavailable—have been confirmed as such for over a year. This suggests that many removals may have resulted from developer decisions rather than government requests. For instance, Avast SecureLine VPN & Privacy has been unavailable since at least December 2023. According to a statement on the company’s website, Avast ceased all operations in Russia, further supporting the idea that this removal was voluntary and not the result of state intervention.
However, some of the clearest inconsistencies in the data concern Roskomnadzor’s own takedown requests, which in several cases targeted VPN apps that had already been removed— raising questions about the accuracy, timing, and intent behind these demands. Of the six unavailable VPN apps named in Roskomnadzor’s recent requests, three were already confirmed as unavailable before the requests were submitted. Thunder VPN – Fast, Safe VPN, Secure VPN – Safer Internet, and ExpressVPN: Fast & Secure VPN had all been removed prior to Roskomnadzor’s March 2025 action, with ExpressVPN disappearing between June and August 2024. This raises an important question: why would Russian authorities request takedowns for apps that had already been removed?
There are two plausible explanations:
- Lack of verification: Roskomnadzor may be basing its requests on secondary sources, such as internal reports or app popularity metrics, without verifying whether the apps are still available. If an app appears on a list of targets, a request may be submitted automatically, regardless of its current status.
- Targeting of URLs rather than apps: It’s possible that the takedown requests are not directed at the apps themselves but at their Play Store URLs, which might contain or redirect to content considered undesirable—even if the app is no longer downloadable.
However, this second hypothesis is somewhat undermined by Roskomnadzor itself, which confirmed to Rusbase that the apps were the intended targets, in accordance with Russian law. Without access to the full takedown notices submitted to Google, it remains impossible to confirm the actual language and focus of the requests.
The likelihood that Roskomnadzor fails to verify app availability is further supported by duplicate takedown requests for the same app submitted within hours or days of each other. For example:
- MyVPN by Softeka Development was targeted twice on March 13, once using the standard URL (https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=ai.myvpn.app) and once using a URL with a language parameter (hl=ru) added.
- MaxiVPN – Fastest VPN Proxy by VPNWholesaler.com was targeted twice, on March 17 and again on March 19, both times with the exact same URL.
Unless these duplicate entries result from an error in Google or Lumen’s reporting systems, they suggest some level of automation in Roskomnadzor’s takedown process—where requests may be generated in batches, possibly without verifying availability or cross-checking against previous submissions.
Conclusion
This study finds that Google has, to a significant extent, resisted complying with the Russian government’s demands to remove VPN apps from its Play Store. Only six apps out of 212 named by Roskomnadzor were found unavailable in Russia, and of those, at least three were removed before the requests were even submitted.
These results contrast sharply with Apple’s actions in 2024, which revealed a more compliant approach to censorship demands. In Google’s case, many VPN apps remain available to Russian users despite official pressure—suggesting either strategic resistance or a more measured response pending legal review.
However, serious concerns remain. A total of 47 VPN apps are currently unavailable, and six apps that were targeted by Roskomnadzor have disappeared entirely from all Play Stores worldwide, with no publicly verifiable explanation. Several removals occurred in parallel with Apple’s confirmed crackdown in mid-2024, raising the possibility of quiet compliance by Google during that period. This underscores the continued need for accountability and transparency—particularly when tech companies operate under pressure from authoritarian regimes.
While Google deserves credit for contributing to transparency through its disclosures to the Lumen database, this level of openness remains insufficient when it comes to fundamental rights like freedom of information. The lack of clarity around takedown request handling, the absence of detailed notices, and opaque removal processes leave users, developers, and rights defenders in the dark.
The study also sheds light on Roskomnadzor’s erratic and inconsistent behavior: duplicative and potentially automated takedown requests, a failure to verify app availability, and unclear targeting criteria. These patterns point not just to bureaucratic dysfunction, but to an arbitrary and opaque censorship process. This lack of clarity adds a further layer of uncertainty for users, developers, and the human rights community—undermining any pretense of transparency or legal consistency, even within the framework of Russia’s authoritarian regulations.
Though the availability of hundreds of VPN apps still offers hope to Russian users seeking secure and uncensored access to the internet, the threat of digital repression remains severe and ongoing. The scale of Roskomnadzor’s campaign—over 200 app takedown requests and tens of thousands of blocked URLs—illustrates a broad effort to restrict information and control digital spaces.
Going forward, platforms like GoogleCensorship.org and Lumen, along with initiatives like the App Censorship Project, will be vital in ensuring that both governments and corporations are held accountable. Continuous testing, greater transparency from tech platforms, and global advocacy for open access and digital rights must remain top priorities in the fight against rising authoritarian censorship online.
